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Turkey: Politics at the
Crossroads of Civilizations1
Maia Carter Hallward
This article discusses how Turkey is often UIider-studied due to
the fact that it does not fit neatly into the analytical "boxes" used
to discuss international politics. Not only does Turkey straddle
Europe and Asia) but it is one of few Middle Eastern countries that
was not ruled by Western empires (and, in fact, controlled parts of
Europe). It is a non-Arab secular democracy currently governed by
a Muslim-oriented party. Because of these unique characteristics,
scholars and policy makers have much to learn from Turkey and its
approach to challenging issues of regional concern.
Introduction
I was recently asked why we in the United States do not hear much about Turkey.
Although there are multiple possible answers, I think that in part we do not hear
about Turkey because it defies easy categorization. Turkey does not fit neatly
into either the box of the 'West' or the "Middle East:' In fact, on a recent trip to
Turkey (March 2009), a Turkish professor noted how his country fell through
the cracks in international affairs classes taught in Europe and North America.
As an ~sian and (Muslim' country, it is often excluded from classes of European
politics, even though in its last decades the Ottoman Empire was considered the
((Sick Man of Europe:' (due to its economic and territorial losses) and Turkey has
been an associate member of the European Community since 1963. Yet Turkey
is also commonly excluded from courses on Middle Eastern politics, since it is
non-Arab) a member of NATO) has one foot in Europe, and escaped Western
colonization. Turkey is a long-standing ally of the United States and of Israel-
although the countries had experienced tension in their relationship in 2009,
both have worked to prevent a crisis. Even though its GDP falls behind that of
most European countries, Turkey has achieved greater economic success than
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many of its Middle Eastern neighbors. Furthermore, Turkey has maintained a
secular democracy since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
This is especially noteworthy given Israel's claims to being the «only democracy
in the Middle East;' a claim which necessarily excludes Turkey from Israel's
definition of the region.
Turkey not only challenges our assumptions regarding the Middle East,
but also challenges our assumptions about Western dominance. The Ottoman
Empire was a powerful European neighbor, dominating the Balkans until it was
defeated after the siege of Vienna in 1683 (Stoye, 2007). Byzantium, which was
renamed Constantinople and then Istanbul, served as the center of the Eastern
Orthodox Church, a rival to the Western Roman Empire. Turkey has a rich
intellectual and economic history. The Islamic University in the city of Harran,
outside of Sanllurfa, was established in the 7th century CE (the first European
universities were not established until the end of the Middle Ages) (Pedersen,
1997), and the Silk Road went through that same area, linking the Orient with
the Mediterranean. Even though modern Turkey is predominantly Muslim, it
was the seat of the Eastern Roman Empire and played a pivotal role in the early
history of the Christian Church. The Nicene Creed, for example, was drafted in
the present day city of Iznik, and although their population is quite small today,
a number of ancient monasteries dot the Turkish landscape (Dalrymple, 1997).,
When Jews were thrown out of Spain as a result of the Catholic Inquisition in the
15th century, the Sultan welcomed them into the Ottoman Empire, where Iberian
Jews in particular achieved significant success (Rozen, 2002).
This ambiguous position can be a strength for Turkey, as it escapes easy
classification and has ties to both East and West. As U.S. President Barack Obama
stated to the Turkish Parliament -during his visit in April 2009, which directly
followed Obama's visit to Europe,
Turkey's greatness lies in your ability to be at the center of things.
This is not where East and West divide-it is where they come
together. In the beauty of your culture. In the richness of your
history. In the strength of your democracy. In your hopes for
tomorrow (Obama, 2009).
This quotation captures the integrative potential of Turkey and highlights its
unique potential for contributing to today's global challenges. Precisely because
of its ability to bridge (East' and (West: to be a Muslim majority country and
a secular democracy, hold membership in NATO, and have connections to the
rest of the Middle East due to its Ottoman past, Turkey has social ties that can
be harnessed to engage constructively with a number of complex issues facing
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policy makers. In particular, Turkey is well placed to provide guidance on the
question of religiously-oriented (Islamic) parties and democracy, finding a way
forward on issues of Middle East peace, and dealing with challenges of human
security. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a speech to the
American Enterprise Institute in January 2004 emphasized exactly the value of
Turkey's unique positionality:
That the Turkish society is predominantly Muslim, has not
prevented Turkey from engaging in a comprehensive interaction
with the West and from becoming an important member of
Western institutions and organizations (Erdogan, 2006).
In the sections that follow, I will explore the lessons that policy makers and
scholars of international affairs can take from examining Turkey's experience
at the crossroads of civilizations, as well as questions worth examining more
carefully in future research.
Political Islam and Democracy
Numerous books have been written on Islam and democracy; these can
be classified into two major subsets, one that examines whether Islam (the
religion) is compatible with democracy and a second that asks whether
religiously-oriented political groups (also called «political Islam» or cclslamist
movements") are compatible with democracy. Whether or not the Islamic faith
is compatible with democracy is a theological debate that remains contested
by Islamic scholars of different persuasions. Depending on how one defines
concepts like tawhid (the unity of God) or understands the parameters of ijtihad
(informed interpretation), one can arrive at very different arguments regarding
the compatibility of Islam and democracy. While some scholars argue that
concepts such as shura (consultation) provide an avenue to Islamic democracy
through governing councils or parliaments, others see the role of shura in a
more limited manner, confined to educated clerics who give advice (Abou El
Fadl, 2003; Esposito & Voll, 1996). Furthermore, many Western orientalists
and Muslim extremists argue that Islam and democracy are fundamentally
incompatible, although their explanations for why this is the case may vary
(Ibrahim, 2007). Reduced to basic (if somewhat exaggerated) premises, the
former argument suggests that Muslims are not (civilized' enough for democracy,
and the latter suggests democracy is a foreign import. Numerous scholars,
(Western' and (Muslim' alike, have sought to demonstrate the compatibility of
Islam through polling data and through surveys examining attitudes on a wide
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range of issues (Le. concern for human rights, leadership preferences, views on
women's rights, role of minorities, etc.) related to democracy (Etzioni, 2008).
Those analyzing these polls argue that there is nothing intrinsic to Islam that
makes it incompatible with democracy, and in fact survey data from the Arab
Barometer suggest that the durability of authoritarian rule in the Middle East is
not the result of ((Islamic culture:' the (~rab mindset:' or because democracy is
a ((foreign" concept (Etzioni, 2008; Jamal & Tessler, 2008).
A second argument on Islam and democracy argues that it is not Islamic
culture or beliefs that explain the lack ofdemocracy in the Middle East, but rather
the socio-political and economic institutions of these countries. Such scholars
note that ethnicity, nationality, and tribe can playa more crucial role in identity-
formation than Islam for many, and that asking whether ((Islam" is compatible
with ((democracy" overlooks the wide variety of religious traditions within Islam,
as well as the wide-ranging geographic, social, and political scope of the Muslim
world. For example, scholars and policy makers note that Indonesia is the largest
Muslim-majority country in terms of population, and has made great strides
toward democracy in the past decade, while India, a long-established democracy,
has a large Muslim population (Brumberg, 2005; Ibrahim, 2007). Looking at
actual political experience in Muslim-majority countries in terms of the electoral
experience of Islamist2 movements as well as the institutional framework,
ideology, goals, and operating principles of Islamic movements and parties,
scholars debate whether groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas use
democratic processes instrumentally in order to gain power and impose shari'a,
or whether engaging in the democratic process can have a moderating effect on
such groups (Bergesen, 2008; Brumberg, 2005).
Bassam Tibi, for example, argues that Islamist movements are inherently
undemocratic, although he affirms that Islam (the religion) and democracy are
compatible in most cases, and acknowledges that some Islamic (as opposed to
Islamist) parties can ((represent a civil Islam" (Tibi, 2008, p. 44). Others assert
that members of the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt have engaged in elections
on numerous occasions and have played by the rules of democracy. In a review
of five books exploring Islamist movements and elections, Vickie Langohr
(2001) argues that the question of whether Islamist movements are democratic
is inappropriate given that most of these movements are contesting elections
in authoritarian contexts. Instead, she suggests, scholars should consider the
possible gains Islamists can achieve by working within the political system, as
well as factors that affect the choice ofviolent or nonviolent methods ofachieving
group aims. While a number of studies exploring whether Islamist movements
engage in the procedure of democratic elections without commitment to the
broader democratic project focus on Indonesia or Egypt, the Turkish case
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is useful in exploring this question, which continues ·to be a critical one in
contemporary Middle Eastern politics.
The AKP in Turkey
The Justice and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalklnma Partisi, or AKP) is
a 'religiously-oriented' or 'conservative' party,3 which came to power in the
2002 parliamentary elections with 34.3% of the vote and was re-elected in 2007
with 47% of the vote, which gave the party 342 seats in Parliament. Part of the
reason for the AKP's success in Turkey, where Kemalist secularism (defined
as state control over religion and an absence of religious symbolism in public
space, not the mere separation of church and state) is fiercely upheld by the
military, stems from the party's moderation, pragmatism, and appeal to pious
people rather than those seeking shari'a law (Ghanim, 2009). The party's view
on the relationship between religion and politics is illustrated in the following
quotation from Prime Minister Erdogan:
While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we do
not think it right to conduct politics through religion, to attempt
to transform government ideologically by using religion, or to
resort to organizational activities based on religious symbols. To
make religion an instrument of politics and to adopt exclusive
approaches to politics in the name of religion harms not only
political pluralism but also religion itself (Erdogan, 2006).
This emphasis on the religious orientation of the politicians in the party, and
their commitment to social values grounded in Islamic beliefs, distinguishes
the AKP from other political Islamist movements. Survey research indicates
that more than four-fifths of the people in Turkey are tolerant of Islamic
community groups, such as the Gillen movement, and differentiate between
these pious movements and those deemed Islamist, which are seeking to
shape political life in accordance with Islamic ideals (Heper, 2009). In fact, the
AKP has not sought to overthrow Turkey's secular democracy, but rather has
governed in accordance with its principles, and was re-elected in large part due
to its success at delivering on campaign promises, such as prioritization of the
economy (particularly economic change benefiting the conservative business
community, or the so-called "Anatolian lions") and commitment to European
Union accession (Ghanim, 2009; Kalaycioglu, 2007). Although the AKP
did seek to lift the ban on headscarf-wearing women in higher education in
February 2008, their efforts were to no avail, and the ban remains in place. The
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headscarf-wearing wives of the prime minister and president have remained
absent from public functions in accordance with state regulations barring the
headscarf from government buildings and official functions.
Under the AKP, Turkey has carried out democratizing reforms that previous
secularist governments were unable to implement. For example, the AKP has
opened space for recognition of the Kurds, made it legal for teaching to occur
in Kurdish, and initiated the first state-run Kurdish-language TV channel in
January 2009. In addition, the government restrained the military and carried
out a limited military operation vis-a-vis the PKK in Iraq rather than engaging
in all out warfare. While political motives, such as a desire to restrict the political
power of the military, which wields substantial power in the Turkish system,
undoubtedly played a role in this decision, it also illustrates a commitment to
secular democratic principles, in which the elected (civilian) government has
oversight of military operations (Ghanim, 2009; Turan, 2007). The government's
efforts to become more accountable to Kurdish concerns are also evident in its
efforts to reach out to Kurdish cities during the 2009 election campaign and state-
ordered excavations of mass graves resulting from the armed conflict between
the PKK and the Turkish military in the 1980s and 1990s. According to some
commentators, the government's tough stance toward Ergenekon (which was
deemed a terrorist organization in August 2009) has further boosted its Kurdish
support (Ayhan, 2009; Staff, 2009).
Furthermore, many of those pious Turks who elected the AKP also
demonstrate their commitment to secular democratic principles. The Gillen
movement, for example, contributes to democracy through charitable donations
to educational institutions and by providing food for the poor. On a March 2009
faculty trip to Turkey, we were hosted by numerous local business associations
affiliated with the Gillen movement who spoke oftheir projects in the community.
These civil associations are grounded in socially conservative values, but are
progressive in orientation to educating the population by supporting those in
need regardless of their background, and by focusing on community-level change
rather than a national political system aligned with Islamic principles. In many
frank discussions with these businessmen over dinner or with families in their
homes, it was clear that secularism was a way of life for these pious individuals.
While their political, social, and economic decisions were informed by their
religious values, they upheld (and believed in) the separation between religion
and politics. The educational and civic initiatives funded by these individuals and
business associations further supports Turkish democracy by helping develop an
informed, thoughtful populace as well as an actively engaged civil society.
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Regional Significance of the AKP's democratic credentials
The importance of the AKP and its example in Turkey is critical precisely
because of the many other Islamist movements that have engaged in the
electoral process (often with very different results) throughout the Middle East
and North Africa. Hamas won the majority of seats in the 2006 Palestinian
parliamentary elections and was promptly boycotted by the international
community; Hezbollah has also held a significant share of Lebanon's
Parliamentary seats, although its coalition gained only 57 seats (out of 128) in
the June 2009 elections. Independents associated with the Muslim Brotherhood
are the main opposition force in Egypt's parliament, with 88 of 454 seats. In
contrast to the assumption of Tibi and others that Islamist parties use elections
for instrumental ends, -CC[i]n power, the AKP has proven, so far at any rate,
that there is no hidden agenda to Islamize Turkish society. Rather, they are
investing in solving concrete socioeconomic and political problems" (Ghanim,
2009, p. 79). Although the 2002 election may have been a reaction against the
previous government (much as the 2006 Palestinian vote was widely seen as a
vote against Fatah's corruption and mis-rule rather than for Hamas), the 2007.
re-election of the AKP resulted from their successful economic policies and
moves for refo~m (Ghanim, 2009).
The experience of the AKP in Turkey demonstrates to both the West and
Middle East, to secularists and Islamists, that there is nothing fundamentally
incompatible between Islam and democracy. It also demonstrates that
religiously-oriented parties can demonstrate commitment to secular principles
and also bring about economic growth and socio-political reform favorable to
democracy. Yet the AKP's experience also suggests that the best way to moderate
or engage with religiously-oviented parties is to allow them to govern, and to
force them to prove their capacity to deliver on their promise to the electorate.
It was this opportunity to govern that was denied to Hamas in the wake of the
2006 elections, and so any of their failures could be blamed on the West or on
Israel rather than owned by the organization. The pragmatism of the AKP is
also possible precisely because of the broader political system and commitment
to secular democracy, as well as the country's bid for joining the European
Union, which requires certain reforms and a commitment to democracy.
The sustained, on-going engagement with the West is important for the
consolidation of Turkish reforms, as is the willingness of the military to refrain
from intervention to overthrow the government. While other Middle Eastern
countries may lack the historical and institutional commitment to secular
democracy, the West can choose how it engages with these countries and their
authoritarian leaders, as well as how it deals with the political opposition posed
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by political Islamist groups. Likewise, the AKP can serve as a role model for
political Islamic groups on how moderation and pragmatism can bring about
political success, domestic reform, and economic gain.
Pursuing Peace in the Middle East
A second way in which Turkey's experience can be illustrativ~ for policymakers
considering approaches for dealing with contemporary global challenges is the
relationship between Turkey and its neighbors. On our trip to Turkey in March
2009 we were hosted exceedingly generously by Turkish families, business
associations, and community organizations who bestowed upon us magnificent
hospitality. The hospitality given to us, we learned, was not the exception, but
the norm; many of our hosts indicated that they receive close to sixty groups per'
year, welcoming these guests into their homes and workplaces for the purposes
of dialogue, relationship-building, and mutual enrichment. Indeed, we learned
a great deal from our Turkish hosts, and the personal encounters provided
an opportunity for us all to serve as goodwill ambassadors for our respective
countries. Yet more than that, we were able to learn first-hand some of the
challenges and opportunities facing ordinary Turks in the course of their lives
as we discussed a wide range of topics and asked one another questions about
politics, culture, and society.
Our hosts demonstrated a genuine interest in learning about ordinary people
from the West (although we were from the United States, they also host European
groups), and recounted proverbs from the prophet Abraham highlighting the
blessing bestowed upon one's home by guests. This desire to engage in dialogue
with others is demonstrated in other, more official efforts at public diplomacy
as well, such as Turkey's hosting of the UNESCO Alliance of Civilizations
forum held in Istanbul in April 2009, or the Abrahamic Path initiative, which
begins in the city of Sanliurfa and moves on to Harran in the southeastern
part of Turkey (Teller, 2009). Turkey's public diplomacy looks both east and
west to build understanding with a variety of others, another example of how
Turkey is not either/or, but both. For example, while meeting with the head of
the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) in Ankara, we learned
about a new channel they are developing that will be broadcast in a variety of
Turkish languages, including Azeri, Uzbeki, and Turkmeni as a way offacilitating
understanding between the Turkic peoples and Turkey. While in a sixth century
Assyrian Orthodox church (The Forty Martyrs Church) in the ancient city of
Mardin, we encountered a group of female Turkish students from Kirkuk, Iraq,
wearing conservative Islamic dress, who are studying in Turkey. The priest sang
a Lenten hymn to us in the Aramaic they use for worship; after singing in the
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ancient language, he noted that a youth chorus from his congregation was about
to travel to California for a cultural festival. This type of inter-faith, transnational
engagement epitomized our brief stay in the Mardin area.
Engaging with the (Other' Next Door
Mardin is a small city on the slope of a hill overlooking the Mesopotamian plains
and close to the border of Syria. It is a mixed community in both national and
religious terms, with Kurds, Assyrians, Arabs, and Turks as well as Muslims,
Christians, and Yazidis all living together. Over dinner one member of the local
community talked about the history of inter-faith, inter-communal mixing and
peaceful relations that existed in the area. When we asked the secret to Mardin's
success, we were told that part of the answer comes from living in small houses
one on top of the other. When you go to sweep your roof or clear your walk, you
encounter your neighbor, you interact and exchange greetings. Then, when you go
away and need someone to watch after your house, you ask your neighbors rather
than contacting someone else in your family oryour religious/national community
from farther away. This daily· interaction and inter-weaving combined with a
respect for each others' traditions builds community and facilitates harmony.
This lesson of reaching out to the other within our own community-making the
effort to know one's neighbor-is of direct relevance to an increasingly integrated
world, when the Global South and the Global North can be found within any
country you visit. Due to immigration, transnational trade, and the globalization
of services, we all have neighbors with different traditions than our own.
The example of Mardin goes beyond simple neighborliness, however, to
illustrate the historical and present signific'ance ofTurkey in regards to the alliance
of civilizations. One of the men we had dinner with traces his roots back to the
seventh century with the expansion of Islam under the Caliph Omar. Speaking
with me in Arabic, he explained that he is a Turk, but he is also an Arab, and
that for him there is no contradiction. The educational institution he works with
does humanitarian outreach and supports the poor in the community regardless
of religion or ethnic background. In addition to Turks and Kurds, Mardin also
has a large Kurdish population, which our hosts emphaSized was not a problem;
they serve whoever is in need, and the community relations that result from this
mutual aid are strong. Mardin's pluralism does not result from mere chance. The
city lies along the ancient Silk Road, and was part ofboth the Byzantine and early
Islamic empires; several of those we spoke with even called the area «Northern
Mesopotamia;' signaling a connection with modern-day Iraq. Our encounter
with the Turkish Iraqi students in the Forty Martyrs' Church and the NATO
installation on the citadel above the town (used for Iraqi and Syrian surveillance)
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also reminded us of the areas strategic location.
Israeli-Syrian Negotiations
Turkey is well-placed to support efforts of Middle East peace, precisely because
of its location as a physical bridge between Europe and Asia, its strong economic,
strategic, and political ties with Israel and its shared history, cultUre, and religion
with the Arab world. Turkey was the second country to recognize Israel after the
United States, and the countries trade close to $3 billion dollars annually. Since the
election of the AKP, Turkey has played an increasingly important role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, which it previously avoided. Specifically, Turkey was mediating
indirect talks between Syria and Israel, until relations cooled as a result of the
December 2008-January 2009 conflict in Gaza (Operation ((Cast Lead))). Turkey
has also played a role in facilitating talks between Palestinian factions. Although the
Syrian-Israeli talks have been put on hold, and Turkish-Israeli relations experienced
a bit of a chill when Prime Minister Erdogan walked off stage during a January
2009 debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos (Bennhold, 2009), the
incident did not result in any significant economic or diplomatic shifts, and by
the end of July 2009 Turkey indicated it was once more ready to re-Iaunch talks
between Damascus and Jerusalem (Nahmias, 2009). At a May 2009 talk on Israeli-
Turkish relations, Israeli Consul General Reda Mansour spoke optimistically of
the possibility for peace between Syria and Israel in 2009 and identified a key role
for Turkey in that process. Ambassador Mansour highlighted the significance of
Turkish-Israeli relations not only on the official level, but also on the social level,
as Turkey is the prime overseas vacation spot for Israeli tourists. For Israel, Turkey
serves as an «honest broker)) in part due to its own history of strained relations
with Syria; Israel's key concerns mirror those that stood between Turkey and Syria
(terrorism and territorial debates) (Mansour, 2009).
In July 2009 Turkey sought to expand its mediating role even further,
suggesting that the next round of Palestinian reconciliation talks between Fatah
and Hamas be moderated by Turkey rather than Egypt (Isaacharoff, 2009). While
this suggestion may be partly based in regional power politics, and Turkey's desire
to assert itselfvis-a-vis Egypt, it also reflects an increased willingness on the part
of Turkey to engage in regional politics beyond its own borders. Such moves
break with Ataturk's tradition of «peace at home, peace in the world)) reflect
the changing nature of global politics as well as the transnational character of
terrorism and other security dilemmas, which mean that sometimes states need
to promote peace in the world to achieve peace at home.
Turkey's focus on dialogue, seeking to understand the other, and efforts
to mediate between rival parties in the region provides an alternative model
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for peacemaking) one based in talking and exchange rather than exclusion
or invasion. Turkey)s more recent approach to dealing with the Kurdish issue
through democratization efforts and socioeconomic development (as epitomized
in the Southeastern Anatolian Project) or GAP) rather than military might and
cultural repression not only enhances Turkish security) but its restraint in dealing
with the PKK in Iraq also reduced existing friction between Iraq) Turkey) and the
United States (Ghanim) 2009).
Facing Contemporary Security Challenges
Security-in all its forms-is a third area in which an examination of Turkey is
important for thinking about contemporary global challenges. As has already
been mentioned) Turkey)s location is strategic not only because it is a bridge
between Europe and Asia) but also because it controls the Bosporus Straits) shares
a border with Iran) Iraq) and Syria) and is a key source ofoil) gas) and water for the
region (Cyr) 2009). Over 40% of Israel's oil) for example) passes through Turkey
(Mansour) 2009)) and Turkey)s role as a through-country for vital energy resource
on their way to Europe is a key leveraging factor for Turkey in its relationship with
the European Union (Bacik) 2006). The Ankara signing of an intergovernmental
transit agreement regarding the Nabucco pipeline in July 2009 was heralded as
a major event (Traynor) 2009). Pipeline politics involve a number of strategic
concerns for the world community. Not only have recent years highlighted the
limited availability of non-renewable energy sources (such as gas and oil) but
with the rise in demand from emerging market countries-particularly China
and India-consumers have experienced a surge in cost) as well as the threat of
a constricted supply. Identity politics also playa role) as Kurdish groups have
targeted Turkish pipelines) for example.
Concerns about Iran and its nuclear program also involves Turkey) as Iran
wishes to transport its oil through the Nabucco project-a 3)300-kilometer
pipeline to carry natural gas to Western Europe via Turkey.4 Given current
concerns-particularly from Israel and the United States-regarding Iran)s
objectives) Turkey)s strong connections with all three major players-Iran) Israel)
and the United States) provide it with the opportunity to exert leverage and
playa vital role in reaching 'a negotiated arrangement. Turkey)s water resources
provide another area where Turkey has strategic leverage given the importance
ofwater in the region. The dams) reservoirs) and canals constructed as part of the
GAP have been a source of some tension with Turkey)s downstream neighbors)
notably Syria and Iraq) but water resources also have the potential for helping
with peacebuilding endeavors) not only in Syrian-Israeli negotiations) where the
water resource of the Golan Heights is at play) but also between Israel and the
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Palestinians (Khoury & Abdel-Samad, 2006; Mango, 2004).
A third area in which Turkey plays an important role in contemporary
security challenges is in the future of Iraq, particularly in light of impending U.S.
troop withdrawal. The United States has been in discussions with Turkey over
using Turkey as an exit route as it moves soldiers, equipment, and munitions
out of Iraq, and given Turkey's experiences in the ~991 Gulf War (as well as its
concerns with the United States' 2003 invasion), this is likely to be an ongoing
- discussion. Regardless, Turkey will have a role to play in helping stabilize the
region after the United States withdraws given Turkey's long standing concern
with regional Kurdish policy and the cross-border attacks that have been launched
by the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey's ties with the
Turkmen in Kirkuk and other areas ofnorthern Iraq also indicate the importance
of Iraqi policy in Ankara (AITunisik, 2006). The March 2009 visit by Turkish
president Abdullah Gul to Iraq was the first such visit in 33 years, and they did
not shy away from sensitive topics, such as the role of the PKK, the status of the
mixed city of Kirkuk, and water sharing (BBC, 2009).
Given that much ofthe currentTurkish government's approach to security issues
has involved a liberal economic agenda-cementing relationships through trade-
the economic downturn may pose a challenge to Turkish domestic foreign policy.
Socioeconomic development through the irrigation and energy projects associated
with the GAP have been one arm ofthe government's handling ofthe Kurdish issue,
and trade-not to mention the economic benefits of tourism-has been critical to
the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Recent efforts to deepen relations with Iraq and
Iran have both involved commitments to boost trade as well as strategic resources
such as oil, gas, or water. The emphasis on trade and dialogue-as evidenced in the
Alliance of Civilizations forum held in Istanbul in April 2009-demonstrates that
security can be approached through non-military means. However, the strategic
importance of Turkey in terms of military cooperation with Israel and the United
States might put Turkey in a tough position vis-a.-vis its internal political struggles
between the secularist military leadership and the religiously-oriented government
over the definition of Turkey's secular democracy.
Conclusion
Often overlooked by those studying "Europe" or the "Middle East" because of
its unique status bridging the two, Turkey is worthy of study for insight into
key contemporary challenges involving how to engage with political Islamic
movements (throughout the world), building peace and democracy in the
Middle East, and regional security concerns in Iraq and Iran. Although Turkey
faces numerous challenges of its own-such as the Cyprus issue, the «events of
Hallward 187
1915" (also known as the Armenian genocide), and the Ergenekon trials-if it
continues to approach these issues in the syncretic manner it has proven itself
capable of, there is reason for cautious optimism.
As the European Union and Turkey continue with the accession talks,
several factors are important to consider. Turkey is a diverse country just as
Europe is diverse; there are millions of Muslims in Europe, not only the result
of immigration, but also from those native to Eastern Europe. The experience of
Turks in Europe demonstrates the capability and commitment ofTurks to engage
in the democratic process. Indeed, the different relationships between Turkish
political movements and government structures in the Netherlands and Germany
reflect the differences between the two political systems and the options available
to Turkish groups (Eickelman, 2009; Yukleyen, 2009). Turkey is a long-time
member ofNATO, and Turkey (along with Greece) was a prime beneficiary ofthe
Truman Doctrine that sought to support democracies in the face of communist
aggression. For many Turks, the question of European Union accession is not
about «joining" Europe, but about being re-integrated into the continent. With
its long history of connection to southeastern Europe in particular, as well as
the many Turks of European descent, Europe does not seem CCforeign" to the
Turks in quite the same way as Turkey is viewed by some European countries.
Furthermore, Turkey has a different relationship with the CCWest" than do other
Middle Eastern countries since it was never colonized by European powers and
successfully resisted European occupation after World War 1.
Turkey also illustrates the importance ofeconomic growth to democratization,
freedom ofthought, and identity politics. Much ofthe new entrepreneurial middle
class in Turkey is from traditional religious roots, and as they have risen in power
and status, they have maintained their piety while also exerting more influence
in both political and economic arenas. While the religious entrepreneurs (the
Anatolian Lions) have maintained their concern for conservative social values,
they have also demonstrated their willingness to adapt and change in accordance
with global trends as well as to blur distinctions between CCEast" and CCWest"
(Tavernise, 2009). Changes in the veiling industry-where large corporations
market fashionable head scarves to an upwardly mobile clientele-as well as
pressure to change regulations banning the veil in university classrooms-are one
example of this trend (Gokariksel & Secor, 2009). The liberal economic agenda of
the ruling AKP also demonstrares the fact that religiously-oriented parties can in
fact be compatible with capitalism, economic development, and democracy.
Scholars of international politics should pay more attention to Turkey
precisely because it does not fit into neat categories of CCWestern" or CCEastern" or
of CCreligious" or ccsecular." By studying how Turkey negotiates its unique identity,
particularly when it leverages its pluralistic identity for the promotion of peace
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and security, we can all learn how to better engage with the diversity ofeconomic,
social, and political exchanges in the global era. Situated at the crossroads of
civilizations and in the heart of contemporary conflicts (energy, water, Arab-
Israeli, and Iraq), Turkey playa key role in efforts to find solutions to today's
pressing concerns.
Endnotes
1 This paper emerges out of a talk given to the Atlanta Council on International Relations
(ACIR) in April 2009.
2 The terminology surrounding this phenomenon is highly problematic as it is framed by
Western scholars and there is not a comparable term used within the Muslim world because Islam
is a religion that speaks to religious, political, economic, and social affairs. For more on the range
of terminology (Le. «Islamic fundamentalism:' "political Islam:' and "Islamism" among others) and
the associated problems with each of these terms, see (ICG, 2005; Mandaville, 2007).
3 Tibi contests this, arguing that the AKP is «intolerant" towards secularlists and non-Muslims
and incomparable to conservative religious parties in Germany, for example (Tibi, 2008, p. 46).
4 This issue has been raised by Iranian ministers with their German counterparts. See http://
www.iranian.ws/iran_news/publish/article_29330.shtml (retrieved May 14, .2009). Israel is also
concerned about a trade protocol signed in April 2009 between Turkey and Iran that would boost
their bilateral trade to $20 billion.
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